TLS Adaptation for Virtualized Border Gateway by Orpana, Pasi Toivo
Pasi Orpana
TLS Adaptation for Virtualized Border Gateway
Master of Science Thesis
Examiner: Professor Jarmo Harju
Examiner and topic approved by the
Council of the Faculty of Computing
and Electrical Engineering on 12th
August 2015
IABSTRACT
TAMPERE UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY
Master's Degree Programme in Signal Processing and Communications Engineering
Pasi Orpana: TLS Adaptation For Virtualized Border Gateway
Master of Science Thesis, 60 pages, 2 Appendix pages
September 2015
Major: Communication Networks and Protocols
Examiner: Professor Jarmo Harju
Keywords: TLS, virtualization, border gateway, cloud computing
WiFi radio access technology is being adopted as a part of the current small cell
solutions of mobile networks. Any WiFi network with Internet connectivity can
be used by the mobile device to access packet-based LTE services like voice calling
and instant messaging. This service traﬃc is strictly conﬁdential and needs to be
protected with encryption when an untrusted access, i.e., a public hotspot access,
is used. This new scenario requires a new network element that terminates the en-
crypted service connection. For Nokia Networks this element is called the Border
Gateway. At the same time the telecommunications industry is moving towards
cloud computing so network elements are being virtualized to operate on virtual
machines running in the cloud instead of the current embedded systems.
This thesis begins by discussing the current industry landscape and how both the
WiFi small cells and the cloud-based network infrastructure are partly answering
the problem of rapidly growing mobile data consumption. The focus of the thesis
is studying the capabilities of the Border Gateway on the context of non-real-time
service traﬃc encryption, with an emphasis on the virtualized platform. Also a
general network security related validation is performed, as this element exists for
providing security features.
The virtualized Border Gateway proved to be ten times more capable than the orig-
inal embedded system, because the current x86-based processors used in the cloud
oﬀer signiﬁcantly more performance than the digital signal processors in the embed-
ded system. The fact that the Unix operating system and related software in the
cloud are mostly open source, proved that security related testing only needed to be
performed on the embedded platform, as there the platform software is closed-source
and not already veriﬁed by the masses.
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WiFi-radiopääsyverkko on tulossa osaksi nykyisten matkapuhelinverkkojen pienten
solujen ratkaisuja. Mobiililaite voi käyttää LTE-verkkojen pakettipohjaisia puheluja
ja tekstiviestejä minkä tahansa Internetiin yhteydessä olevan WiFi-verkon kautta.
Näistä syntyvä liikenne on täysin luottamuksellista, ja se tulee suojata salauksella,
kun epäluotettavaa verkkoa, kuten julkista WiFi-verkkoa, on käytetty. Tämä uusi
skenaario edellyttää uuden verkkoelementin toteuttamista, johon salatut yhteydet
terminoidaan. Nokia Networksin kyseinen elementti on nimeltään Border Gate-
way. Samaan aikaan televiestintätoimiala on siirtymässä kohti pilvilaskentaa, jossa
verkkoelementit virtualisoidaan ja ne toimivat pilvessä virtuaalikoneiden päällä nykyis-
ten sulautettujen järjestelmien sijasta.
Tässä diplomityössä aluksi käsitellään nykyisiä toimialan näkymiä ja miten pienet
WiFi-solut ja pilveen perustuva infrastuktuuri ratkaisevat nopeasti kasvavan mobiili-
datan käytöstä aiheutuvia haasteita. Itse työ keskittyy tutkimaan Border Gatewayn
kyvykkyyttä salata ei-reaaliaikasta liikennettä, painoittuen virtuaalisen alustan omi-
naisuuksien tutkimiseen. Lisäksi kyseiselle verkkoelementille suoritettiin yleinen
verkon tietoturvavalidointi, johtuen siitä, että elementti on runkoverkkoon päin tule-
vien yhteyksien terminointipiste ja täten se on merkittävässä asemassa takaamassa
runkoverkon turvallisuutta.
Virtualisoitu Border Gateway osoittautui kymmenen kertaa suorituskykyisemmäksi
verrattuna alkuperäiseen sulautettuun järjestelmään, koska nykyiset x86-suoritinarkkiteh-
tuuriin perustuvat suorittimet ovat merkittävästi suorituskykyisempiä kuin sulaute-
tussa järjestelmässä käytetyt digitaaliset signaaliprosessorit. Pilvessä käytetty Linux-
alusta perustui pitkälti avoimeen lähdekoodiin, jolle tietoturvavalidointi ei ole tarpeelli-
nen toisin kuin sulautetun järjestelmän suljettuun lähdekoodiin perustuva alusta,
jota ei ole valmiiksi validoitu suuren yleisön toimesta.
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11. INTRODUCTION
Possibly the largest shift in the basic structure of mobile networks infrastructure is
about to happen in the near future. This change is driven by money, as is the nature
of any business, but the end result for the end user is that they get to enjoy the
continuous growth of cheap broadband data for years to come. The feasibility of this
change is dependent on how ready the available technologies are to support this type
of change. The way was paved by the IT industry which has beneﬁted greatly from
it and the telecommunications industry is now in a hurry to follow and reap the same
rewards. This change is, of course, the transition to cloud-based services. Currently,
the mobile network core elements are proprietary made hardware and mostly unique
between manufacturers but the transition to the cloud makes it possible to separate
the software and hardware businesses. The cloud provides a pool of general purpose
computing power that can be used to run virtualized network element software and
construct the whole core network solely of virtualized network elements.
This thesis work is the product of advances in multiple aspects of mobile commu-
nication ﬁeld in general. WLAN radio access technology is standardized to being
just another small cell RAN in a fully packet-based LTE network. It is possible for
a public and privately managed WLAN networks to be used for making phone calls
and sending text messages. Encryption is vital as these public WLAN networks are
used as a part of the carrier's data path for packet-based carrier services.
This thesis focuses on Nokia Networks product called Border Gateway. This net-
work element is responsible for terminating the encrypted connections from user end
devices and route the traﬃc to the core network. The focus is in the part of the
Border Gateway software that is responsible for the non-real-time traﬃc encryption
like text messages and data transfer. This software was modiﬁed to operate on a
x86 platform used in a cloud environment as a virtualized Border Gateway. En-
cryption requires the most resources in this context and the goal was partly to see
how a DSP processor performs such a task and how it compares to a virtualized
implementation.
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Chapter 2 explains why the industry is moving towards the cloud and why we are
now facing the need for encryption mechanism for user plane data. The network
and cryptographic protocols that are relevant in the scope of encrypted non-real-
time carrier provided service traﬃc are explained in Chapter 3. The Border Gateway
network element is brieﬂy explained in Chapter 4 and also the speciﬁcs of the rivalling
DSP and cloud platforms. Chapter 5 explains the reasoning and methods on what
was measured and why this data helps in comparing the two diﬀerent platforms.
Chapter 6 goes over the data and compares the results from both platforms. The
goal of the last chapter is to evaluate the feasibility of a virtualized Border Gateway
on the perspective of how it handles this speciﬁc encryption use case.
32. MOBILE NETWORKS EVOLUTION
We are currently moving into the fourth generation of mobile broadband networks.
Long Term Evolution (LTE) is often used as a synonym for 4G networks, although
this is not entirely accurate. LTE increases throughput and decreases latency of the
network, but the most signiﬁcant change is the migration to a packet switched all-IP
network. It is the ﬁrst radio access technology that is 100% packet-based, which
combined with the all-IP network core, translates into greater eﬃciency. Eventually
mobile devices could operate with a single radio module, because all the cellular
services will be packet switched.
Why and where comes the need for creating a secure path for the user's traﬃc
through the radio access network (RAN)? Is the need for encryption linked to the
industry's migration to virtualized network components? This chapter provides the
answers to these questions and the background for the thesis.
2.1 Telco Cloud
Mobile broadband operators are facing challenges many didn't foresee, the whole
ﬁeld is reacting, instead of responding to the rapid growth in mobile broadband
traﬃc. Increasing capacity is expensive and utilizing it eﬃciently is problematic.
Additionally, mobile networks are transitioning from being transport-centric, where
the focus is on delivery of packets, to becoming service-centric, where intelligent
end-to-end features deliver services eﬃciently and cost eﬀectively.
The network is utilized where the users are, so a typical scenario is where the net-
work in suburban areas is lightly utilized during business hours and highly during the
evenings. This behaviour in network utilization is predictable but the unpredictable
scenarios are also a problem, which currently cannot be met with traditional infras-
tructure. The network's resources in a particular area are static while its utilization
is erratic.
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Many generations of technologies are overlapping and the complexity, and all the
problems that come with it, is increasing. This may be transparent to the users, or
more precisely to the clients. Operators are looking for increasing revenue and they
start to see the path that the IT industry as a whole has embraced.
The movement to decouple the software and hardware is not a new thing in the
industry. The growing complexity is showing especially in the core network where
the number of diﬀerent elements has increased with every generation. The ﬁrst steps
to separate software from the hardware was for the industry to use a single platform
for all the network elements. The Advanced Telecommunications Computing Archi-
tecture (ATCA) was speciﬁed in co-operation by more than 100 companies [1]. It
provides a hardware platform for the industry as a whole to be used as an oﬀ-the-self
solution. Before ATCA, diﬀerent network component vendors had their own speciﬁc
hardware and software. The NSN Open Core System, released in 2011, provided a
single hardware platform for many diﬀerent core network elements [2]. This provided
ﬂexibility for the operators and the possibility of redeﬁning the network elements,
just by switching software, to meet diﬀerent traﬃc demands. Although, the hard-
ware was still vendor speciﬁc to some degree, meaning that only NSN software could
be used.
The next step is to decouple the business and the hardware, which is what cloud is
all about and what the IT industry have used for great beneﬁt. The move to the
cloud is not as straight forward for the telco industry. The carrier grade Quality of
Service (QoS) parameters and real-time computation needs of, for example, audio
signal processing for a phone call are one of the challenges that the traditional cloud
infrastructure cannot answer. The server hardware that cloud service providers
use in their datacenters is designed for general purpose computing, which does not
perform the computational tasks of signal processing very eﬃciently, compared to
a DSP processor. Eﬃcient architecture for a speciﬁc task consumes less processor
cycles and therefore less electricity, which is a cost factor for the operators.
The change that has driven the industry towards the cloud is greatly inﬂuenced
by the steady increase in general purpose, x86-based, hardware performance. The
rate that DSP processors evolved is much slower and thus the gap between general
purpose and signal processors is diminishing. Doing the task intended for a DSP
may be slower and less eﬃcient for a x86-based general purpose processor, but
the scalability of cloud computing makes this a moot point. The way diﬀerent
processor architectures are developing, x86 could eventually match or surpass DSP
performance in signal processing computing.
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The motivation to break the link between software and hardware has mostly come
from market forces. Business terms like decreasing Capital expenditure (Capex)
and Operational expenditure (Opex) often surfaces when virtualization and cloud
computing are mentioned. The change is also being formalized through the work
on Network Functions Virtualization (NFV) by the European Telecommunications
Standard Institute (ETSI), which aims to encourage international collaboration to
accelerate development and deployment of interoperable solutions [3].
Telco Cloud is a long term plan for the industry. Software can be decoupled from
proprietary hardware to operate on general purpose hardware through the use of
virtualization layers in the software. A fully ﬂedged Telco Cloud is automated,
standardized and programmable, it deﬁnes the cloud management framework. A
Telecom grade cloud environment has requirements that the existing IT clouds don't
satisfy. A large number of virtual nodes with internal hierarchies and networks and
a carrier grade service level agreement (SLA) of 99,999% are needs that are not
met with current frameworks. Guaranteed computing resources that are always
available and the possibility of soft real-time computing, meaning maximum latency
guaranties for processes are also a requirement.
Figure 2.1: Disaster countermeasures using network virtualization [4].
How does Telco Cloud eﬀect the end users? The possibility of accurate and near
real-time automated resource allocation depending on the time of the day and the
location minimizes the situations where users cannot utilize the network as they
see ﬁt due to network congestion. A more important factor is the mobile network's
ability to function under unpredictable loads during disasters, natural or man made,
as shown in Figure 2.1. The 2011 tsunami in Japan increased the voice call volume
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50 fold from normal in the area [5]. It is safe to say that the majority of the calls
did not connect and possibly lives were endangered because of this.
2.2 Core network
Operators build their networks to handle the amount of traﬃc they deem suﬃcient.
The bursts of high traﬃc periods that are above the average should not aﬀect SLAs
and therefore capacity is scaled based on that, meaning that most of the time the
valuable core network elements are utilized with relatively low loads. Core network
virtualization has emerged as a key approach to maximizing network resource utiliza-
tion and thereby minimizing network OPEX, meaning that operating expenditure
would no longer consist of under used resources.
LTE network core is the Evolved Packet Core (EPC) and it consists of elements like
the Home Subscriber Server (HSS), that can be virtualized and basically made into
a just another piece of software that can be executed in a cloud environment. This
can be seen in Figure 2.2, where all the EPC elements are running on diﬀerent clouds
and data centers, but in a more common situation all of them would be centralized
in a single data center.
Figure 2.2: Virtualization of EPC network elements [6].
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2.2.1 IP Multimedia Subsystem
IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) is an architecture framework deﬁned by 3GPP [7],
that deﬁnes an equipment and service agnostic system, as well as the underlying
standards, like standards for security, quality-of-service, and interoperator account-
ing [8].
IMS stands for IP multimedia subsystem, but on today's world, the name can be
deceiving. IMS used to be an IP-based subsystem inside the core network, that man-
aged multimedia services and delivered them over to the packet switched networks.
IMS is no longer a subsystem, although the name has stuck, it is the network core
and everything else builds around it, as shown in Figure 2.3. IP-based networks oﬀer
superior scalability and cost eﬃciency compared to what circuit switched networks
could oﬀer. The rapid growth in mobile broadband traﬃc needs has driven the in-
dustry towards an all-IP model, which LTE networks are embracing fully. [9] IMS
Figure 2.3: IMS domain overview, adopted from [9].
itself is a huge system with many aspects, but we are interested mainly on the new
emerging access network types and the challenges they bring with the combination
of new multimedia services, like VoLTE. With 3GPP's Common IMS, a wide variety
of access networks are supported, most importantly WiFi.
Regarding virtualization, IMS core is also a prime candidate for it because of its
compute-oriented nature, so it is suited to hardware that can leverage memory and
CPU performance and beneﬁt from the rapid upgrade cycles in the commercial
server market [10]. For example Telephony Application Server (TAS) is one the key
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component of IMS core and also for handling the packet-based services, which are
discussed in Subsection 2.3.
2.2.2 Heterogeneous networks
The number of users and services that utilize mobile broadband access is increasing
at such a rate that mobile operators are struggling to keep up with the demand.
Estimation done by The Strategy Analytics showed that mobile data traﬃc grew
by 100% in the year 2012 [11]. Data traﬃc was forecasted to increase by 400%
by the year 2017. In 2013, the number of mobile-connected devices exceeded the
world population and by 2017 there will be about 1.4 mobile devices per capita [12].
Figure 2.4 illustrates the data growth forecast up to 2017.
Figure 2.4: Growth forecast in annual mobile data traﬃc [11].
The way to increase capacity is to increase spectral eﬃciency, spectrum amount, and
network density. Little improvement can be gained by working on the ﬁrst two be-
cause current networks are already operating at near optimal regarding these issues.
Network density cannot be increased by using the same radio access technology as
overlapping cells start interfering and causing more harm than good.
Places where the network utilization is highest are usually centralized to certain
localized indoor areas such as shopping malls. These hotspots can use most of the
resources of the whole macrocell that is supposed to serve a large area. Traditionally
the way to increase network capacity was to set up more macrocell base stations.
At the current rate macrocell deployments are increasing capacity 30% less than the
demand for data [13].
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Smaller cells inside the macrocells can be used to ooad traﬃc from the macrocell
and improve frequency reuse. The term small cells encompass indoor femtocells,
outdoor picocells or a compact base station microcell. Additionally, small cells can
oﬀer increased traﬃc capacity compared to the macrocell, as they can adapt better
to traﬃc variations by employing dynamic interference management techniques [13].
Figure 2.5: Diﬀerent RAN technologies overlapping forming a heterogenous network [14].
The diﬀerent kind of small cells have low transmit power and coverage depending on
the type. There's no clear deﬁnition for the cells but femtocells usually have a range
of 10 meters, picocell 200 meters and microcells up to two kilometers. Networks
that utilize both macro and small cells are referred to as Heterogeneous networks
or HetNets. Figure 2.5 illustrates the overlapping of diﬀerent sized cells. HetNet
with hundreds or thousands of small cells requires extra control traﬃc that stresses
the transport and core networks so that the complex network operates seamlessly.
HetNets can be complex networks so many of the conventional controlling operations
have been automated so that the cell deployment and operation would be as simple
as possible.
Small cells introduce security related challenges that were not present with macro-
cells. Small cell basestations can be situated in varying locations so physical security
can be non-existent or the location is managed by a 3rd party so physical tampering
needs to be anticipated. In most cases inherently insecure public Internet connection
is used for access to the core network and therefore the traﬃc needs to be encrypted.
Operators are trying to increase capacity while reducing the overall costs and small
cells are providing both. Macrocell basestations are less energy eﬃcient than their
small cell counterparts as their power ampliﬁers require separate cooling. Oﬀ-loading
traﬃc to small cells have been found to reduce the overall energy consumption by
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25% to 30% [13].
The industry has adopted small cells as an integral part of the modern wireless
broadband network as femtocell deployments made up 56% of the global base station
deployments [13]. Small cells and heterogeneous networks play an integral role in
the global mobile broadband infrastructure.
2.2.3 WiFi ooading
WiFi has become a standard feature in virtually every mobile device. The unlicensed
spectrum and low-cost hardware creates great value for users and operators. WiFi
networks are also prevalent as they are commonly used in public hotspots, private
networks and business environments. 70% of mobile broadband traﬃc occurs indoors
so the majority of the network load is generated in potential WiFi coverage areas [15].
Ooading traﬃc from the congested mobile network to a WiFi small cell has many
beneﬁts. Unlicensed spectrum makes it basically "free" for operators to exploit. Also
the spectrum is diﬀerent compared to existing small cell networks so no interference
among overlapping cells. Close proximity to the base station require lower transmit
powers so battery usage is smaller compared to using a mobile RAN.
Small cell WiFi networks are not always managed by the operator itself, they can
be managed by 3rd party providers. The goal is to use whatever WiFi network is
available and in most cases they are 3rd party networks. One additional beneﬁt
from this is that the backhaul connection is also maintained by the provider so the
operator don't need to bear the expenses.
The base stations can also be located in places, where physical security cannot be
guaranteed. These small cells provide security of varying strengths, so on the op-
erator's point of view, they can be considered untrusted networks. It is therefore a
requirement for operators to have media plane security, which provides uniform pro-
tection against eavesdropping and undetected modiﬁcation across access networks.
3GPP speciﬁcation TS 23.402 describes the integration of trusted and untrusted IP
access networks into 3GPP systems [16]. The intent of 3GPP-WLAN interworking
is to extend 3GPP services and functionality to the WLAN access environment. It
provides the packet switched bearer services to be used over a WLAN connection.
The standard accepts that a WLAN is as valid an access network as any other 3GPP
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RAN. Untrusted access means that encryption is required so a secure path needs
to be formed over the untrusted network. IPsec is the standard solution to create
a secure tunnel to the ePDG (Evolved Packet Data Gateway) which terminates
the tunnel and operation is as usual after that point, as illustrated in Figure 2.6.
This needs authentication using the SIM card data and therefore needs multiple
mechanisms that devices can transparently use WLAN access.
Figure 2.6: Path from an untrusted Wi-Fi RAN to operators network, adopted from [14].
Seamless WLAN ooading in mobile networks is coming but is not yet supported
as a standard way of every day usage. Before it is implemented out as a feature,
the existing WLAN networks are already preferred by the devices to be used for
general, non-bearer traﬃc, if they are available. This is basically manual ooading
done by the users, if they connect the device to an locally available WLAN network.
The end goal of WLAN ooading is to take the pressure out of the macro networks
when possible to ooad everything, including packet-based bearer service traﬃc,
which are discussed in Section 2.3.
WLAN ooading is at the focal point of this thesis as it introduces the concept
of untrusted networks to be used to access core IMS network. Operator provided
services situate in the IMS core and can be used over untrusted networks so service
traﬃc is encrypted with security methods like the Transport Layer Security (TLS).
This level of encryption is not employed if the used access is deemed trusted, for
example if the mechanisms are in place and the device forms the IPsec tunnel over
the untrusted network, then it is considered trusted access and additional encryption
is not needed.
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2.3 Services
Making voice calls and sending text messages are the traditional cellular mobile
services that are supported by all compliant devices. No matter the country or the
model of the device, these services are natively supported. The ﬁrst 2G network was
launched in 1991 called Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) which has
circuit switched voice calls and text messages [17]. All calls and text messages sent in
a 3G, and with some exceptions in 4G, networks still use a circuit switched network,
which exists only for these services. This means that there are overlapping legacy
network technologies in the access and core network, which increases complexity.
The overlap of circuit and packet switched domains is seen in Figure 2.7.
Figure 2.7: Circuit and packet domains, adopted from [18].
The majority of mobile operators revenue comes from voice and SMS services, which
is a problem because the revenue from these sources is dwindling. Data traﬃc is
increasing rapidly partly because voice and Instant Messaging (IM) needs are met
with 3rd party applications. Flat-rate data subscription plans are popular among
operators but problematic because they start to eat away the proﬁts from other
sources. The rapid adoption of smartphones and availability of aﬀordable broad-
band connectivity has provided consumers access to a wide variety of communica-
tion services which go beyond the traditional services of voice and text messaging
provided by mobile operators. The ﬁrst to fulﬁl the potential were Over-The-Top
(OTT) applications, made by 3rd party developers.
The rise of these OTT services has fragmented the communications landscape, e.g.,
it is not possible to make a VoIP call from one application to another. Although,
using OTT services is basically free if a ﬂat-rate data subscription is presumed.
The reason why this has not replaced traditional calling completely, is that OTT
communication applications are closed ecosystems that are not interoperable and
2. Mobile networks evolution 13
cross-platform support is rare. Consequently, OTT services are dependent on mobile
broadband coverage and the willingness of subscribers to use a service that lacks
quality, security, seamless mobility and ﬂexibility. This fragmentation has provided
an ideal opportunity for mobile operators to mend the decline in revenues.
There are two types of communication services, Non-Real-Time (NRT) and Real-
Time (RT). Voice communication is RT and instant messaging, or SMS, a NRT
service. The fundamental diﬀerences of these service types impose very diﬀerent
requirements and therefore they are implemented with diﬀering technologies, which
are discussed in the following subsections.
2.3.1 VoLTE
LTE is an all-IP technology so on the long term, all the cellular services will be
packet switched, as circuit switched networks will not be maintained indeﬁnitely.
Voice over LTE (VoLTE) is the prevailed technology that will be used for voice calls
in 4G networks. For VoLTE to diﬀerentiate itself from OTT services, operators need
VoLTE to provide carrier grade capabilities and a guaranteed Quality of Service
(QoS). This means VoLTE must deliver the same level of quality and reliability that
has been the norm in circuit switched services, which can be challenging at ﬁrst
when noting the fact that CS services have matured over two decades.
The QoS parameters of a voice call are strict but straight forward to manage in a
circuit switched network, where a suﬃcient portion of the capacity is allocated for the
ongoing call. The challenges are diﬀerent when moving to a packet switched network.
IP networks operate on a best eﬀort model. Real-time applications like voice calls
need a certain promise of latency and also need to work in heavily congested network.
To monitor and manage the QoS of any VoLTE session, operators must record and
co-relate these measurements per subscriber, location and device type in all layers
including the network, transport, IMS and application layers [19].
Figure 2.8: SRVCC handover scenario [20].
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LTE and VoLTE market penetration is gradual so diﬀerent generation of networks
will be maintained parallel for a long time. During the transitioning period, where
4G networks are not fully covered everywhere, there needs to be a backup plan for
voice calls. Before VoLTE is supported on the 4G network, calls will use Circuit
Switch FallBack (CSFB), meaning that the underlying 2G or 3G network will be
used. After VoLTE deployment, if one participant of the VoLTE call leaves the LTE
network coverage area, as illustrated in Figure 2.8, the call needs to be switched
over to the new network. This handover mechanism is called Single radio Voice Call
continuity (SRVCC). The call will be seamlessly handed over to a circuit switched
bearer. This is one opportunity where VoLTE has the ability to diﬀerentiate itself
from OTT services, because no such mechanisms exist there.
VoLTE is expected to go beyond just voice. Video calling, ﬁle sharing and instant
messaging services will complement VoLTE for it to compete and hopefully surpass
the OTT provided services. These complementing services are implemented using
Rich Communications Services which is discussed in the next section.
2.3.2 Rich Communications Services
Rich Communications Services is an industry driven initiative run by GSMA. It
brings together all the decision makers in the telecommunications industry to create
an "interoperable, convergent, access-technology-independent rich communications
experience to end-users" [20]. It doesn't deﬁne new standards, but brings together
already deﬁned services into proﬁles based on global standards of the IP Multimedia
Subsystem.
VoLTE can be seen as a foundation service for RCS as they share the same IMS
investment and leverage the same IMS capabilities. The RCS ecosystem can also
work as an incentive for operators to shift existing 2G/3G voice services to an IMS
architecture to tap to the new emerging value added by RCS.
RCS was launched by GSMA in 2008 to provide Rich Media services that made use
of the plentiful mobile broadband data that was becoming more prevalent. There has
since been many national trials and tests but RCS needed to be supported by every
device and platform to achieve what it was set out to do, which was to provide out
of the box support for UE devices for packet-based messaging. Commercial launch
has taken longer than expected so OTT-services like Skype, Google Talk and many
more were deploying faster.
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With VoLTE and RCS operators can provide the same services that OTT-services
can and also improve upon the experience. The necessity of RCS lies with two main
points: Global interoperability between socially driven services and moving from
platform-centric to subscriber-centric social networking [20]. If the world adopts
RCS as is envisioned by GSMA, the way how social information is shared will change
to something diﬀerent.
The goal is to make RCS a native client to every device, so no additional installation
is needed as it is built in the networks and devices. OEMs (original equipment man-
ufacturers) are governing the ecosystem, instead of a 3rd party developers. All ser-
vice capabilities are available by default, which makes it much easier for subscribers
to ﬁnd and select attractive new services, signiﬁcantly lowering the threshold for
adopting them.
RCS-e initiative was launched to lower the entry barrier for RCS by allowing oper-
ators a way to use RCS without implementing the full service proﬁles. The RCS-e
subset of services are carefully selected based on those with highest consumer de-
mand. Chat, ﬁle sharing and the ability to share live video or images during a call
are the RCS-e speciﬁed services. Social proﬁle sharing is an optional service that
can be supported depending on the operator.
VoIP applications, including VoLTE, operate over UDP to meet the real-time needs
of voice calls. The only RCS-e real-time service is video streaming which uses Real-
time Transport Protocol (RTP) over UDP. Chat and ﬁle transfer naturally use TCP
as the transport protocol. The application level protocol that most of the RCS
services use is Message Session Relay Protocol (MSRP) which will be studied in
more detail in Chapter 3.
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3. PROTOCOLS
The BGW uses many diﬀerent kinds of transmission and signalling protocols in its
operation. This section aims to provide an overlook, in suﬃcient detail, on the rele-
vant network protocols that are in the scope of this thesis. When creating a secure
path trough an untrusted, 3rd party managed, access network, encryption is needed
to bring the security aspect to a carrier grade level. Cryptographic protocols are
needed to create a secure path of communications trough an untrusted network. Two
UE devices communicating using VoLTE/RCS require end-to-access-edge (e2ae) se-
curity.
3.1 Deﬁnition for Security
Before going deeper in to the inner workings of TLS protocol, it's important to give
a clear deﬁnition for the words like secure or security on the context of IT network
communication. Such words are easily thrown around without clear meaning or
understanding.
The Dolev-Yao model is a formal model that is used to prove properties of interac-
tive cryptographic protocols. The algebraic model is not relevant on our context but
the model deﬁnes the network and the adversary. The network consists of abstract
machines that exchange messages and the adversary, or attacker, who carries the
messages [21]. The attacker has complete control over the network but cannot com-
promise the machines themselves. The TLS and SSL protocols have been designed
to be secure in the Dolev-Yao model [22].
In general, a security deﬁnition must answer the following points [22]:
1. What are the capabilities of the attacker? For example computing resources,
time, types of attacks.
2. What is the task that the attacker must accomplish in order to be successful,
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i.e., ﬁguring the secret key used for encryption.
For a strong deﬁnition, we assume that the attacker is as powerful as possible and
tries to achieve the simplest of tasks. When the attacker fails to get any beneﬁcial
information from the messages that are going trough the network, even when he
has complete control of the network, time and resources, then we can say that the
machines can securely exchange messages.
3.2 TLS - Transport Layer Security
Transport Layer Security (TLS) is a set of cryptographic protocols that can provide
a secure communication path trough an insecure network. The largest such networks
is the Internet and TLS is the standard for websites to support. In a recent survey,
it showed that 99.2% of the most popular websites on the Internet supported v1.0
of the TLS protocol [23].
Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) is the predecessor of TLS. The ﬁrst public version of SSL
was v2.0 but it is considered insecure and majority of websites don't support it [23].
SSL v3.0 and TLS v1.0 are supported by almost every website. Newer versions of
TLS are v1.1 and v1.2 but, at the time of writing, only about one third of the most
popular websites had support for the latest versions.
Figure 3.1: Transport Layer Security and protocol stack. [24].
As the name suggests, TLS provides security for the transport layer, meaning that it
operates between transport and application layers in the OSI model, as shown in the
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Figure 3.1. Applications work on top of TLS and can do so without any knowledge
of the underlying protocols, meaning that it is application protocol independent.
The TLS protocol provides everything from authentication and key management to
encryption and integrity checking. The protocol itself has two diﬀerent phases of
operation: setting up the connection and steady-state communication.
In this chapter, we are going trough the TLS protocol operation from start to ﬁnish
on a general level, with an emphasis on resource usage on diﬀerent parts in the
protocol. We are interested how much computing resources do the complex crypto-
graphic calculations require and how these requirements might reﬂect on the actual
usage in diﬀerent CPU architectures.
3.2.1 Protocol details
As stated before, TLS protocol can be divided in to two components: the TLS
Record protocol responsible for data transfer, and the TLS Handshake protocol.
As TLS operates over TCP/IP, the three-way TCP handshake must be performed
before anything regarding TLS can be done. TLS is an asymmetrical protocol,
meaning that it diﬀerentiates between the client and the server [24].
Once the TCP connection has been established, the TLS handshake can begin. The
TLS Handshake Protocol is responsible for authenticating the server and the client
to each other and to negotiate the symmetric encryption key. Usually only the client
is interested about the servers credentials, but it is possible for the server to ask for
client certiﬁcate, although this option is rarely used. Figure 3.2 shows a high-level
sequence diagram of the handshake protocol.
The handshake goes as follows:
1. The client sends a "Client hello" massage, along with clients random value
and supported cipher suites.
2. Server answers with "Server hello", with random value, server certiﬁcate, ses-
sion ID and the selected cipher suite.
3. Client generates a random Pre-master Secret and encrypts it with the servers
public key that was received in the certiﬁcate.
4. Server and client generates the Master secret and the session keys from the
Pre-master secret.
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Figure 3.2: New TLS connection handshake [25].
5. After this both parties have agreed on the session keys and they can transfer
data securely using this key for symmetric encryption.
The handshake procedure is the most resources demanding operation of the TLS
protocol. Because of this, session caching is an option to reduce unnecessary CPU
cycles. If the client reconnects, only the session ID needs to sent so the server can
use the corresponding cached Master secret to generate the session key.
After the connection is setup, data can be transferred, as illustrated in Figure 3.3.
First, if the used block cipher is AES, the data is broken in to 16kB blocks and
compressed, if it was negotiated during the handshake. A Message Authentication
Code (MAC) is calculated from the packet and added at the end of the packet, along
with a sequence number. The compiled packet is then encrypted using the session
key with the negotiated encryption method.
Cipher suites are a set of cryptographic primitives that individually perform a very
speciﬁc task, but putting them together as a suite, they form the cryptographic
system. The used suite for the session is ﬁrst suggested by the client during the
ﬁrst message in the handshake. The client sends a list of supported suites and the
server selects the preferred suite, which is usually the strongest. The suite needs to
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Figure 3.3: TLS processing steps during data exchange [25].
be supported by both peers, but the server selects the one it wants and it can also
abort the handshake, if it doesn't accept any of suggested suites. The client can
suggest any suite, even the weak ones.
There is a balance between security and how much computing resources the suites
need. Suites, that provide weaker security are usually faster and vice versa. For
example, using a public key size of 2048 bit compared to 1024 bit key, provides
better security but is more consuming to compute.
Ciphers suites deﬁne cryptographic primitives for three diﬀerent functions: Au-
thentication, encryption and message authentication. Authentication is done with
asymmetric encryption, which means the use of public and private keys. Encryption
is done with symmetric encryption primitives as message authentication is done with
hash functions. There are many diﬀerent combinations of primitives. The cipher
suite format is for example: TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA. First is the
authentication method. In this case the key exchange method is ECDHE and with
RSA signing. Data encryption method is AES with 128bit key and message signing
is done with cipher block-chaining a Secure Hash Algorithm (CBC-SHA). The TLS
1.0 speciﬁcation mandates, that a TLS 1.0-compliant application must implement
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cipher suite TLS-DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES-EDE_CBC_SHA. This is the only one that must
be supported by applications, all the others are optional [22].
3.2.2 Certiﬁcates - X.509
TLS and SSL use Public Key certiﬁcates, but the speciﬁcation of the certiﬁcates is
outside the scope of TLS and SSL speciﬁcation. The used standard for Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI) is the X.509 system. It deﬁnes the format for the public key
certiﬁcates, certiﬁcate revocation list and attribute certiﬁcates, among other things.
The same format for certiﬁcates is used by many other cryptographic protocols, such
as IPsec and IKE. RFC speciﬁcation describes public certiﬁcates as a special case
of certiﬁcates that binds its owner to a public key value. As such, it is a digitally
signed data structure that attests to the true ownership of a public key [22].
During a TLS handshake the server sends its certiﬁcate that holds its public key
which is digitally signed by a Certiﬁcate Authority (CA). Without the CA signature,
it cannot be veriﬁed, that the public key belongs to the entity that is speciﬁed by
the certiﬁcate. The client encrypts a message using the public key and knows that
the only one who can decrypt the message is the holder of the corresponding secret
key. A trusted intermediary is needed to have a trust anchor that can be trusted
completely. When a CA signs a certiﬁcate with its digital signature, then it can be
trusted that this public key corresponds to the owner with as much certainty as the
trust you place on that CA.
Figure 3.4: A public key certiﬁcate comprising three pieces of information. [22].
A certiﬁcate holds three key pieces of information. The public key, naming infor-
mation and one or more digital signatures, as shown in Figure 3.4. The naming
information speciﬁes the owners name, and more importantly, the network address
of the public keys owner. The digital signature is made by the CA by calculating
a hash value from the key and naming information. The calculated hash is then
"signed" by applying encryption using the CAs private key.
The validity of the certiﬁcate can be made sure by calculating the hash value from
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the certiﬁcate and decrypting the signature using the CAs public key. The hash
values are the same, if the certiﬁcate is the same from which the CA calculated the
signature.
Validating the digital signature requires to have the CA public key. Every applica-
tion or system that uses X.509 certiﬁcates need to have all the root CA public keys
locally on ﬁle. These are certiﬁcates that are self-signed by the root CAs. They are
the trust anchors that can be depended upon. There are many dozens of established
root CAs whose certiﬁcates are included for example in web browsers.
Self-signing enables anyone to create a certiﬁcate and sign it by themselves. There
is no diﬀerence in the viability of the certiﬁcate if it is self-signed or signed by a CA.
The only diﬀerence is that for a CA to sign a certiﬁcate, they validate the business
and domain in question for whose certiﬁcate they sign. That is the product they
are selling, trust. In the case of web browsers, they always expect for certiﬁcates to
be signed by an approved CA, a self-signed server certiﬁcate will ﬂag the server as
potentially risky.
3.2.3 Performance analysis
The BGW (Border Gateway) will operate on two diﬀerent platforms, the DSP plat-
form and the virtualized x86-based platform. As complex as cryptographic cal-
culations are, the computational costs are dwarfed by the performance of modern
processors. For example, Google started to use TLS encryption for every connec-
tion to Gmail and the encryption takes around 1% of the servers resources [17]. As
the DSP processor architecture is made for signal processing and x86 is for general
purpose computation, the capabilities of cryptographic calculations on both plat-
forms need to be investigated whether they have any possible eﬀects on the normal
operation of the BGW.
As noted earlier, asymmetric encryption is much more computationally expensive
than symmetric encryption. During a TLS session asymmetric encryption is used
during the handshake and symmetric for data transfer. The overall eﬀects of the en-
cryption methods depends on diﬀerent factors, biggest of them being the handshake
procedure.
RSA is one of the most used public-key cryptosystems, so using that as a baseline
comparison is convenient. In public-key cryptography, modular multiplications are
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the most expensive operations. Multiplying large numbers and calculating their
modulus are the basic operations in RSA. The way RSA works, the maximum mes-
sage size is the same as key size, including a minimum of 11 bytes of padding. With
a 1024-bit key the encrypted message can only be 128 bytes long, with 2048-bit key
it's 256 bytes. There is no standardized way of splitting data into blocks with RSA.
It is not meant to function like a block cipher. By comparison, encrypting 256 bytes
worth of data with RSA takes hundreds of times longer, compared to a symmetric
encryption method.
One of the most common symmetric encryption algorithms is AES. Since 2008, Intel
processors have had an instruction set called AES-NI. This enables the processor,
on the hardware level, for optimized AES algorithm calculation. Intel states, that
for non-parallel modes of operation, AES-NI can provide two to three fold gain in
performance [26]. This can be tested with OpenSSL toolkit speed command, which
is used to test the performance of cryptographic algorithms.
Command A = openssl speed -elapsed -evp aes-128-cbc
Command B = OPENSSL_ia32cap="~0x200000200000000" openssl speed \
-elapsed -evp aes-128-cbc
Block: 16 bytes 64 bytes 256 bytes 1024 bytes 8192 bytes
----------------------------------------------------------------------
A 542554.85k 573966.78k 586127.19k 585141.93k 587923.4
B 251690.11k 295278.08k 304876.29k 311101.78k 309996.20k
The test was run on a virtual machine (VM) with Intel Xeon CPU E5-2665 @
2.40GHz. The 'numbers' are in 1000s of bytes per second processed. Command A
is with AES-NI enabled and in B while disabled. No matter the block size, AES-NI
acceleration provides the performance Intel claims, around two times faster when
compared to the non-accelerated case. The DSP processor we are testing against is
a Texas Instruments TMS320TCI6486 [27]. Core speed is 625Mhz and as there is
no instruction set for AES, only one result:
Block: 16 bytes 64 bytes 256 bytes 1024 bytes 8192 bytes
----------------------------------------------------------------------
A 27962.03k 41943.04k 41943.04k 41943.04k 41943.04k
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DSP processors are, as the name suggests, made mainly for signal processing, mean-
ing that the processor instruction sets are related to that ﬁeld, for example audio
processing algorithms. There are no instruction sets that optimize cryptographic
algorithms in the current DSPs that are used by the telecommunications industry.
This is a big advantage for the virtual platform, as seen in these tests with more
than ten times the performance diﬀerence between the platforms. Although, a new
generation of DSP processors from Texas Instruments are coming in the near future
that have instruction sets for cryptographic algorithms, but the actual performance
beneﬁts are still up for speculation [28].
The loads that the diﬀerent algorithms introduce to the system depend on the use
proﬁle. Every new connection requires the expensive handshake to be performed.
If the user base operates in a way that the connections lasts long and the users
don't change very often, the computational costs, in the long run, comes from the
symmetric encryption. In a case where users connect to the network, performing the
handshake, transfer a small amount of data and then disconnect, it raises the impact
of the handshake procedure, because that is what is done most of the time. The
use proﬁle of the connections can be informatively speculated, but no system level
design decision can nor should be made upon this speculation. It is safe to assume
that a large number of diverse users generate a dynamic traﬃc pattern, while they
are using diﬀerent services like sending a single text message or making long lasting
video calls.
TLS has multiple mechanisms for combating the impacts of the handshake. To avoid
a full handshake, the client can request a abbreviated handshake. The server will
send a session ID in the "Server Hello" reply, as shown in Figure 3.2. In order for
this to work, the client and the server need to store the session IDs for later use.
The client can then resume the previous connection by attaching the session ID in
the "Client Hello" message. The server can then ﬁnd the session information in the
cache and resume the connection. The beneﬁt from this is to skip the more costly
part of the handshake, the public-key cryptographic operations. The previously
negotiated session key is possessed by both parties, so they can start using symmetric
encryption.
Another mechanism is the usage of session tickets, detailed in RFC 5246 [29]. The
server can include a "New Session Ticket" during the last full handshake, this is
not represented in Figure 3.2. The ticket contains the complete session state, in-
cluding the master secret, the cipher suite used and etc. This ticket is encrypted
and authenticated by the server, with a encryption key only known to it, using
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AES128-CBC-SHA256. The client can then send this ticket during the "Client Hello"
message and the session can be resumed.
There are pros and cons for using either of the previous methods. Caching the session
IDs takes memory from the server and sharing the cache between load-balancing
hosts can prove diﬃcult. It is, however supported natively by TLS, unlike session
tickets. The ticket mechanism is an optional extension to TLS and is therefore not
as widespread as support for session identiﬁers. The main beneﬁt is that servers
don't need to maintain a session cache, the tickets are held by the clients and all the
information to resume a session is encrypted within. The used encryption method
for the tickets, AES128-CBC-SHA256, has faced criticism. It is deﬁned by the RFC
and cannot be changed by the user. This means, that the ticket can be encrypted
less securely, than the resumed TLS connection.
Figure 3.5: TLS handshake protocol with latency. [17].
TLS, inadvertently, adds latency. Every connection starts with the TCP three-
way-handshake, which causes a delay of one full round trip time, as shown in the
Figure 3.5, where the one-way delay is selected as 28 milliseconds. As TCP takes
one RTT to initialize, TLS takes two RTT, so the add in delay is signiﬁcant. The
add in latency from using TLS can have an eﬀect on the system and therefore should
not be overlooked.
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3.2.4 OpenSSL
It is possible to create an implementation of TLS protocol by following RFC 5246
and starting to write code but creating a robust implementation of an encryption
protocol is something that even professionals haven't fully managed to do. Encryp-
tion is rarely done without a good reason and it only takes one ﬂaw in the code to
compromise the whole thing. There are many encryption frameworks freely available
and OpenSSL is the most widely used. It is included in many Linux distributions
and can be considered the standard implementation.
OpenSSL encompasses more than the name may suggest. It is a set of many diﬀerent
cryptographic algorithm implementations and oﬀers an application programming
interface (API) so that it can be used by programmers. All versions of SSL and TLS
protocol implementations are included which require many diﬀerent cryptographic
algorithms to work. These basic cryptographic functions are also oﬀered for use over
the API, for example calculating a SHA-1 hash value for a given input data.
The project has been ongoing for about ﬁfteen years now and is still compatible
with the software and hardware from the previous millennia. The code base is so
littered with legacy implementations that they obfuscate the code and make it very
unpleasant to work with. This is the main problem of the project that is supposed
to use the resources of the open-source community but the reality is that most
volunteers are turned oﬀ by the poorly managed code.
The greatest attribute of OpenSSL used to be the fact that its source code is open
for public and anyone can look for bugs and vulnerabilities. But who would use
an encryption library whose source code is not available for viewing, as this would
prevent the veriﬁcation of the encryption process? There would need to be com-
plete trust to the maker of the library as without it there are no assurances of the
soundness of the encryption. If this privately developed library would become as
prevalent as OpenSSL, then there would be an authority in the world who could
have implemented a way around the encryption and could potentially decrypt any
encrypted message. These kind of doubts will always exists and therefore the only
way to have a globally used encryption library is to make it open-source.
The open-source nature of OpenSSL also used to be the reason why it is so secure.
If anyone in the world can inspect the code and correct bugs, how can there be any
bugs left? This false sense of security is rapidly changing with the recently discov-
ered vulnerabilities in OpenSSL. At the time of writing the so called Heartbleed
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bug was discovered that used a vulnerability in the TLS heartbeat extension. When
exploited the heartbeat responses contains up to 64kb of data from the servers in-
ternal memory. So it is possible to get private information from the servers memory,
including passwords, master keys, etc. When the discovery was made public, around
17% of secure web servers in the Internet were vulnerable[30].
Heartbleed was such a serious ﬂaw that another development team started their own
project called LibreSSL. Recent versions of OpenSSL contains about 388 000 lines
of code. The LibreSSL team removed 90 000 lines of code in the ﬁrst month without
eﬀecting normal operation. It is a promising project but it was primarily devel-
oped for OpenBSD operating system and has limited support for other platforms so
replacing OpenSSL with it is not yet fully possible.
3.3 Multimedia Communication protocols
Delivering multimedia content in the Internet is enabled by a multitude of IP-based
application-level protocols. These protocols form the core of multimedia communi-
cation systems architecture and no system can exist without them [31]. They work
in unison for content delivery and can be categorized into two groups, as illustrated
in Figure 3.6.
Figure 3.6: Multimedia communication protocol architecture [31].
Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) is the core signalling protocol. It is responsible for
all aspects of session management and therefore used for establishment, modiﬁcation
and termination of the session. Session Description Protocol (SDP) messages contain
generic information about the multimedia sessions and they are transported inside
the body of SIP messages. This separation of management and description into
independent functions is a powerful concept. It allows both mechanism to evolve
without eﬀecting each other and therefore making them forward compatible for
future developments [31].
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The actual content delivery is the responsibility of media transport protocols which
are:
• Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP)
• Message Session Relay Protocol (MSRP)
RTP, as the name suggests, is designed to handle real-time media and to cope with
the delay variations that are inevitably introduced by the nature of the underlying
IP-network. RTP over UDP is the used transport protocol in VoLTE calls. For
connections over an untrusted access network, Secure Real-time Protocol (SRTP)
can be used for encryption.
In the scope of this thesis, we are more interested about the Message Session Relay
Protocol (MSRP) as it is the used media transport protocol in the RCS context.
Operating over TCP, it is used for non-real-time features like instant-messaging,
photo sharing and ﬁle transfer. Even though MSRP is the top level protocol that
is being forwarded through the BGW in the RCS use case context, the connection
isn't terminated on the BGW and therefore it is just bits that are routed through
the BGW, so a brief overlook on the details of MSRP is suﬃcient.
As previously stated, the sessions are initiated using SIP with SDP and the actual
content delivery is done with MSRP messaging. MSRP is a relatively simple protocol
with similar syntax as other IETF-based protocols such as SIP and HTTP. Messages
are either requests or responses, but not every request has a corresponding response.
Request message types are SEND, REPORT and AUTH [31]. SEND requests are
used for content delivery, REPORT is optionally used for end-to-end acknowledge-
ment of message delivery and AUTH is used in MSRP relay mode authentication.
An example SEND request message containing a single instant message:
MSRP j4l34uud7 SEND
To-Path: msrp://ocean.com:12763/p33deirfwy2;tcp
From-Path: msrp://sea.com:7654/geiuf4oi3yr;tcp
Message-ID: 85749983
Byte-Range: 1-19/19
Content-Type: text/plain
Hello, how are you?
-------j4l34uud7$
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Any MSRP message always starts with characters MSRP, then transaction ID and
method type. To- and From-Path ﬁelds contain the sender's and recipient's MSRP
URI. The URI info is ﬁrst exchanged with SDP session descriptors using SIP at
session creation. It has two purposes, identifying IP address, with a fully qualiﬁed
domain name (FQDN), and port for TCP connection setup and also identifying the
MSRP session. The URI format is shown in Figure 3.7.
Figure 3.7: MSRP URI format [31].
Message-ID is an unique identiﬁer for a single complete message. Byte-range iden-
tiﬁes the range of bytes that are in this message and the amount of bytes of the
complete message. Content-Type identiﬁes the type of the message data, in this
case being plain text and it is followed by the actual message. The end line contains
a string of seven hyphens ('-'), transaction ID and either a '$', indicating the ﬁnal
message of this message-ID or a '+' character, meaning that this was not the ﬁnal
message for this message-ID.
If an image, video or ﬁle transfer is done, the message will be fragmented into
multiple chunks. This transaction has a message-ID that is the same for all the
chunks and the byte-range ﬁeld indicates how many bytes are there in the complete
message and how many in this message. Also the last character of the message will
be '+' in all but the last message, which will have an '$' character [31]. This is
the basic mechanism in MSRP for transferring diﬀerent types of content with sizes
varying from single text message to a ﬁle transfer that must be split into chunks.
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4. BORDER GATEWAY
This chapter introduces the Border Gateway as a network element and the services
it provides as a product. A more in depth look is taken to the aspects that are
relevant for the RCS traﬃc encryption use case regarding the BGW, especially
security related challenges and motivations.
4.1 Overview
The oﬃcial name for the Border Gateway is Open BGW and it is a Nokia Networks
product that is part of the Nokia IMS Border Control Solution [32]. Said solution
is an integral part of the Nokia Voice over LTE end-to-end system. As seen in
Figure 4.1, signalling and media plane handling responsibilities are divided to two
diﬀerent systems. The BGW handles the media plane and it is controlled by the
CFX-5000 SIP session controller, that handles the control plane SIP messaging.
Figure 4.1: Nokia IMS border control solution [32].
Border Control, as the name suggests, is the entity between network borders. For
example it can reside between the IMS core and an IP access network or between two
peering IMS networks. It controls the delivery of all-IP IMS services which means
that no IP content moves between the networks without control so it is responsible
for network security. These aspects will be explained in more detail in Section 4.2.
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The BGW, in 3GPP tems, implements IMS Access Gateway (IMS-AGW) [33], which
is required when an access network is connected to the IMS. Other 3GPP functions
are needed when, for example, two peering IMS networks are connected, but in that
case there are no untrusted networks and additional encryption is not required and
therefore it falls outside the scope of this thesis. Connected access networks can
be untrusted depending on their nature. In Figure 4.1 there is a list of IP access
networks and Internet is surely one of the possible untrusted access networks. The
Border Control Solution is basically a Session Border Controller (SBC), which will
be discussed in the next section.
4.2 Session Border Controller
Session Border Controller is an element regularly needed in common VoIP networks
to exert control over the IP traﬃc. In many cases the need is to hide network topol-
ogy and to protect the service provider or enterprise packet network from outside
inﬂuence [34]. A general view of a VoIP network, which also applies to mobile net-
works, is seen in Figure 4.2. IP traﬃc needs to get to the core network, but it must
do so in a tightly controlled way. The need for control is even more important when
the SBC is handling the border of a public access network, like the Internet. In that
case it must deal with a number of security considerations:
Denial-of-Service (message ﬂooding)
Intentional malicious traﬃc, whose goal is to prevent others from using the
service, is a common problem that is hard to solve. Unintentional ﬂooding
can also be a problem, with almost the same impact as intentional ﬂooding.
For example, after a large-scale power outage a ﬂood of registration requests
is automatically sent when the devices gain power.
Malformed messages
Intentional or not, incorrect protocol messages can cause problems if the net-
working stack cannot handle unexpected inputs. It can cause the receiving
endpoint to behave in a unexpected manner; usually a DoS-type situation.
Traversing ﬁrewall or NAT
NAT devices are prevalent in network borders to hide network topology, which
the SBC must be able to handle when controlling connections to diﬀerent
endpoints.
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Regulatory mandate (lawful interception)
Governmental regulations often require the option to lawfully intercept calls
and the SBC must provide the means to do that, at least in carrier provided
services.
Ensuring QoS
Ability to prioritize traﬃc and ensuring service quality is a generic issue that
cannot be taken for granted in IP traﬃc.
Figure 4.2: General view of SBCs in a VoIP network [34].
When a UE device initiates a session, e.g. using a RCS service, it must send a SIP
message to start the process. This initial step is the most common situation where
the need for an entity like the SBC is needed. Anyone connected to the Internet can
send a SIP message to the SBC, as it must be open for accepting SIP messages. As
the Nokia Border Control Solution is a decomposed SBC, where the signalling and
media transport responsibilities are divided to diﬀerent devices, the only relevant
security considerations regarding this thesis are the possible threats on the media
plane traﬃc, speciﬁcally the NRT traﬃc. This traﬃc consists of diﬀerent protocols
that are terminated on the BGW and it must be able to handle anything that might
arrive from the UE. Possible malformed messages are the only threat that must be
mitigated regarding the BGW and NRT traﬃc and this is explained in more detail
in Section 5.1.
A more detailed view of the usage and position of the BGW at the border of an LTE
packet core and a public access network with other Nokia network elements is seen
in Figure 4.3. The mentioned NAT devices are not visible here because the BGW,
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as a carrier grade element, comprises in its entirety of many common networking
devices, including NAT.
Figure 4.3: The BGW as an IMS Access Gateway handling trusted and untrusted networks,
adopted from [35].
Figure 4.3 shows the operation of the BGW with two diﬀerent access networks.
Operator managed LTE packet core network doesn't need additional media plane
encryption, which is seen in the upper part of the ﬁgure. This thesis work studies
the non-real-time MSRP traﬃc that ﬂows between the UE and the BGW and is
encrypted due to the untrusted access network. The encrypted connection over the
untrusted network is terminated on the BGW and the traﬃc is forwarded to the
IMS core, which can be seen in the lower part of the ﬁgure.
4.3 ATCA platform
The whole BGW ATCA platform houses diﬀerent functional units, which are oper-
ating on their corresponding blades on the ATCA shelf. The only relevant blade for
this work is the DSP blade, which houses hundreds of individual DSP cores. A single
ATCA based BGW can be allocated to serve hundreds of thousands of subscribers,
so multiple blades of DSPs is required to handle the traﬃc that carriers face. The
BGW application software that handles the encryption and packet forwarding runs
on a single DSP core and it serves only a handful of concurrent connections.
The performance of a single DSP core is under analysis in this thesis because it does
the media plane operations of the BGW and is only multiplied to increase capacity.
So once the capabilities of a single DSP is known, then the overall performance of
the whole system is also known. The system is getting simpler when only looking at
a single core because then the architecture resembles that of any other traditional
embedded system according to the model in Figure 4.4. In the simpliﬁed architecture
there is a single DSP is doing the computing in the hardware layer, a real-time
operating system (RTOS) in the system software layer and the BGW application
forming the application software layer.
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Figure 4.4: Embedded Systems Model, adopted from [36].
The actual model of the DSP device that was used in this thesis is Texas Instruments
TMS320TCI6486 [27]. It is designed for telephony infrastructure applications and
houses six physical cores operating at 625MHz. One of these cores will do the
computing when the system performance is measured. The clock rate of the CPU
in itself doesn't necessarily reveal much about the capabilities of the system because
CPU instruction sets, system memory bandwidth and the type of the calculations
are also a deﬁning factor. This DSP in question has speciﬁc functions which it was
designed to fulﬁl with great eﬃciency, but e.g. AES encryption calculations doesn't
happen to be one of them.
4.4 Virtual platform
The virtual platform should function identically, as the embedded version, but it
must do so by running on a virtual machine in the cloud. When comparing the
virtual system to the model in Figure 4.4, the diﬀerences are that on the hardware
layer there is a x86 CPU and a Linux OS with additional layers on the system
software layer. The application code is untouched, excluding some small platform
related changes. It is important to notice that the most signiﬁcant diﬀerence between
the platforms is the CPU.
The same real-time requirements are also in eﬀect here so the biggest challenge is to
be able to provide a real-time environment for a Linux process. The challenge comes
from the fact that Linux kernel related operations can and will cause interrupts to
use the CPUs [37]. This is transparent to the running process but it will add latency
which is not acceptable when the process is implemented on the assumption that
nothing interrupts its operation. The general way to solve this is to allocate one
core, from a multi-core system, that the kernel interrupts never use and also make
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sure that no other process is running on that core. There are a number of ways to
achieve this but doing so in a virtual machine does not guarantee that the actual
physical core, which the virtual CPU uses (vCPU), is not used by other virtual
machines or even the host platform. This is a general issue with cloud technology
which Telco cloud needs to be able to do, but falls outside the scope of this thesis.
Figure 4.5: Virtual platform architecture overview.
In this work, the full control of a single CPU core was achieved using a Light
Weight Run Time (LWRT) execution environment [38]. It is a commercial oﬀ-the-
self product that partitions the system to a real-time and non-realtime domains and
thus makes it possible to allocate cores to either domain. A high level architecture
view of the cloud system is in Figure 4.5 with depictions of the same layers as in
Figure 4.4.
The used CPU was Intel Xeon E5-2665 with 2.4 GHz core speed [39]. The clock
rate is roughly four times faster than the rate on the DSP platform. As stated on
Subsection 3.2.3, all modern Intel processors have an instruction called AES-NI that
provides optimized instructions for AES calculations and its impact on performance
should be signiﬁcant.
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5. TESTING METHODS AND SOFTWARE
This chapter introduces the aspects that will be tested and the used software. The
testing methods are explained with detail so that they can be reproduced. These
methods can be applied to any similar network element so very system speciﬁc
details are left out.
5.1 Security
The Border Gateway is located at the border of the core and the interconnected
IP access network. Such access network can be the public Internet, but the BGW
is not directly seen from the access network side as network topology is obfuscated
with the use of NAT devices. Any feature that is implemented on a network element
such as the BGW must be done in a way that secure operation isn't compromised,
although nothing is truly secure but every reasonable action should be taken to try
and ensure it.
Any data that is by its nature considered untrusted and processed or manipulated
in any way by the system has the possibility of causing unwanted operation. In
this case, the untrusted data that eﬀects the operation of the BGW are the network
protocol message headers that originate from the UE device and are terminated
on the BGW. These protocol headers are read and the system acts accordingly. If
the protocol messages are malformed, by accident or deliberately, and the protocol
implementations aren't robust, bad things can happen.
The BGW application software can run either on the embedded DSP or the cloud
platform. Even though the software may be mostly similar, the two diﬀerent plat-
forms use diﬀerent implementations of the network protocols. Varying kinds of
network protocols are in use in the normal operation of the BGW but on the scope
of this thesis work we are interested on the protocols that are used in the RCS
messaging use case and also terminating on the BGW itself. Protocols that we are
interested are from bottom to top: IP, TCP, TLS and MSRP.
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The BGW application is running over a Linux platform in the cloud. TCP and IP
protocols are implemented in the Linux kernel and these can be considered secure
and pointless to test for any vulnerabilities. Linux has been around for a long time
and used in untold secure servers so it is outside of the thesis scope to search for
any vulnerabilities concerning Linux.
On the DSP side things are diﬀerent. The platform the BGW application is running
on the DSP is not considered to be a public commercial product. This means that
we cannot straight away presume that it has already been rigorously tested. As TCP
and IP are fundamental network protocols they are, also in this case, implemented
in the kernel of the underlying operating system.
The BGW can be presumed to be behind a standard NAT router meaning that IP
packets arriving to the BGW originates from the NAT device and therefore can be
considered non-malicious in nature. Regardless, IP is the fundamental underlying
protocol and can be tested with little extra eﬀort. TCP packets on the other hand
are originating from the UE device and are terminated on the BGW, so the TCP
implementation must be robust and be able to handle any scenario without problems.
TLS protocol is also terminated on the BGW and the protocol messages are also
generated in the UE end. The same level of robustness is expected from the TLS im-
plementation. In both platforms the TLS implementation comes from the OpenSSL
framework as it is the defacto SSL/TLS implementation and is used globally on
most Internet related services. We are not interested to test OpenSSL in itself, as
it also is outside the scope of this work, but as TLS is the top level terminating
protocol, the robustness of the system and correct error handling is eﬃciently tested
through TLS protocol testing.
MSRP is an application level protocol and from the BGW point of view is consid-
ered just a payload inside the TLS frame so anything related to MSRP protocol is
hard to see aﬀecting the operation of the BGW in any way. Malformed or inten-
tionally malicious MSRP messages should not cause problems for the BGW. As the
MSRP messages can be considered personal data between the recipients, there is no
lawful reason to even look at the actual MSRP payload. Taking everything in to
consideration, IP, TCP and TLS implementations are the ones that will be tested.
The robustness of the network protocol implementations are only a concern on the
DSP platform as the used proprietary software is speciﬁcally made for the embedded
platform and not openly available to the public. In the cloud this is not the case as
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all the software can be considered public and therefore robust enough.
The source codes of the tested protocol implementations are not available so we
must regard the system as a black box. We can insert inputs and receive outputs
from the system but cannot see what happens or why. The goal is to ﬁnd an input
that causes the system to behave in an unexpected manner. As we don't have any
idea what to search for, the only option is to try all the possible variations of the
inputs. The more complex the protocol, the more diﬀerent variations there are.
Creating thousands of test cases manually where the sent message diﬀers from the
correct protocol format is not practical as it requires a lot of eﬀort and still we
cannot be sure if all the right combinations were tested. This kind of testing is
called fuzzing and there are dozens of commercial and free fuzz testing frameworks
available. Fuzzing is a negative software testing method that feeds a system with
malformed and unexpected input data in order to ﬁnd unknown vulnerabilities.
The testing was done with Codenomicon Defensics software and it can be considered
the most comprehensive fuzz testing framework available. The OpenSSL Heartbleed
bug was discovered trough Codenomicon testing [40]. With Codenomicon software
it is quick and relatively eﬀortless to ﬁnd defects that can be triggered by malformed
inputs. There are testing suites available for almost all the common network proto-
cols. These suites contain possibly millions of machine generated test cases of the
protocol in question.
No matter what protocol is being tested, Codenomicon tests usually have the same
basic idea as illustrated in Figure 5.1. In a simple scenario the test cases can be
sent without any preparation of the tested system. In our case the system requires
control plane signalling to prepare the connection setups so our test system too
will need to send signals to the system so that it will be ready to accept incoming
connections.
After the system is ready for an incoming connection, malformed packets, incorrect
protocol messages, repeats of correct or incorrect messages or anything in between
are sent to the system. After every case a valid message is sent as an instrumentation
to check, if the test case had any ill eﬀects on the system. If the system responds
correctly and on time, the test passes. If the system is unresponsive or takes longer
than speciﬁed to answer, the case can be deemed a failure.
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Figure 5.1: Codenomicon testing method.
5.2 Performance
Testing the system's performance is done for multiple reasons. Firstly, to make sure
that the system's performance is at an acceptable level, so that it can serve the
amount of connections that it is supposed to be able to serve. Secondly, how do the
two diﬀerent platforms compare? We start to see the eﬀects of available computing
power and how it scales on both platforms.
Network throughput is one of the most important variables when starting to mea-
sure the overall performance. Data that is being forwarded by the BGW is either
being encrypted or decrypted, depending on the direction. So the limiting factor
on how much data can traverse through the system is most probably the systems
ability to encrypt or decrypt data. There are no speciﬁc performance goals but
the only variable that is deﬁned is the amount of simultaneous connections. The
speciﬁcations were decided with the DSP platform in mind as the virtualized im-
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plementation can still be considered more of an prototype than a ready, releasable
product. Nevertheless, the software is as identical on both platforms as possible.
The amount of latency that the BGW induces on the messages that traverse trough
it, is also a measurable variable. Although, the MSRP messages are non-real-time
traﬃc and latency is not an issue, as long as it is in acceptable levels. The QoS model
for IP-based traﬃc is normally a best-eﬀort model, so it is important to verify that
all the connections receive an equal amount of resources, if the BGW ends up being
the limiting factor. Measuring the individual message latencies and their spread
in diﬀerent scenarios is one way to make sure that all the connections are treated
equally.
Lastly, measuring the used processor resources that are utilized at any time is vi-
tal, as it is probably the limiting factor for total throughput. TLS handshake is
performed for every new connection and it is an expensive operation, but its eﬀects
will be minor overall, assuming they are not performed constantly. This assump-
tion may be dangerous regarding system performance, but there simply isn't any
information available on the probable use proﬁles of the RCS service as it is still
in the development phase. The assumption that the results are relying on is that
the system needs to perform handshakes so sporadically, that they will not aﬀect
the performance and can therefore be ignored as a factor in the measurements. So
the only cryptographic operation is the symmetric encryption/decryption that is
performed for the passing data.
Planning comparable measurement methods for two diﬀerent kind of environments
requires that the used tools can operate on both platforms. Also, the environments
are not fully controllable, especially the systems around the DSP platform. We ba-
sically must make do with what tools are already available as installing additional
software is probably not worth the eﬀort. The common factor for the test environ-
ments on both platforms is that there is a Linux system with network access to the
tested system. Even though they are diﬀerent Linux distributions, there are tools
that are included in most of them by default.
We need to simulate the UE devices, so we need two endpoints that are able to
send and receive TCP traﬃc, encrypted or not. We also need to be able to generate
MSRP traﬃc in suﬃcient amounts so that we can ﬁnd the maximum throughputs of
the systems. This all can be done with the following simple tools that are available
in most Linux systems:
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openssl s_server
A generic SSL/TLS server to accept incoming connections.
netcat
Versatile and feature-rich networking utility for reading and writing to TCP/IP
connections.
dd
A Linux command primarily used for converting and copying a ﬁle.
I/O redirection
It is relatively straightforward in Linux to direct the output of one program
as a input to another program, with bash commands like "|" or ">".
The scenario where the measurements will be taken is one where a UE device from
a trusted network sends as many MSRP messages as the BGW will handle. The
BGW will encrypt the data and send it to the UE that is located on the, supposedly,
untrusted side. Generating as many such connections as possible should impose the
BGW as a bottleneck and reveal its performance characteristics.
Figure 5.2: Test setup conﬁguration.
The measurements procedure goes as follows:
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1. Required amount of OpenSSL s_servers are launched and they begin to listen
to their port for an incoming connection.
for x in range {50000..50063}; \
do (openssl s_server -cert mycert.pem -accept $x > /dev/null) \
& done
This simple Linux bash script can be run from the command line and starts
64 instances of s_server to listen ports 50000 through 50063 and directs the
output from them to /dev/null ﬁle descriptor, so the large amounts of incoming
data will be discarded straight away as there is no need to store it. A certiﬁcate
ﬁle is also needed by the s_server.
2. With control plane signalling messages, the connections are initiated on the
BGW so that every s_server instance receives an incoming encrypted connec-
tion from the BGW so there will be 64 TLS connections between the BGW
and the s_server instances. After this the BGW will be listening on 64 dif-
ferent ports for the connections that will be paired for the already established
encrypted connections. For this test, the consecutive ports are used for easier
management.
3. Now we need 64 instances that are able to send continuous non-encrypted
MSRP traﬃc.
for x in range {10000..10063}; \
do ((while true; do dd if=msrp.txt; done) | netcat 12.248.204.155 $x) \
& done
This creates 64 netcat instances that connect to the given IP and to ports
10000-10063. With every instance there is a dd command in an inﬁnite loop
copying the ﬁle mrsp.txt, that contains lots of short MSRP messages, as an
input to netcat which sends it forward in chunks as TCP packets.
4. After this the MSRP messages are sent indeﬁnitely to the BGW that encrypts
it, forwards it to the corresponding connection that upon receiving it discards
it. To get measurements with diﬀerent amount of connections, the connections
are torn down, one by one, through control plane signalling. This way the
eﬀects of handshakes are not visible as they are performed at the start of the
connection in step 2. The complete setup is illustrated in Figure 5.2.
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Depending on the achieved throughput, there is a possibility that dd cannot read
the ﬁle from disk fast enough and that becomes the deﬁning bottleneck. As the data
is sent over a network interface, that too can possibly be a restricting factor. If the
BGW achieves maximum CPU utilization, then all the other possible bottlenecks
can be ruled out. The 64 connection pairs are running on a single computing core
and at least on the DSP side, a single DSP core is not expected to achieve high
symmetric encryption throughput, as found in Section 3.2.3.
Latency can be measured by sending a timestamp inside a MSRP message payload
and substracting it from the current time when it is received by the other end. This
was done by getting a timestamp with millisecond precision from the $(date) bash
variable and with the previous steps and simple scripts that did the subtracting.
This is an unreliable method as operating system interrupts and process handling
can have an eﬀect on how close the results are to the actual latency. The accurate
way would be to monitor the timestamp that is generated by the network adapter
hardware upon sending and receiving packets. We are after for possible high laten-
cies, that would be visible in text message communication, so nanosecond accuracy
for timestamps is not needed.
Latency will ﬁrst be measured by initiating 32 connection pairs, where the trusted
side sends one MSRP message, with the timestamp as payload, randomly between 1
and 10 seconds, in an attempt to mimic an actual chat session. Data is collected for
about 10 minutes to get the general trend visible for the latency graph. After this,
additional 32 connections pairs are added that generate as much load as possible to
stress the BGW. The goal is to see if high load connections increase the latency of
other connections. Comparing results from the DSP and the virtualized platform
could have given some insight on how the diﬀerent platforms behave and if there
is any noticeable diﬀerence regarding latency. Unfortunately, latency measurement
was only possible in the virtual platform, as this method of latency measurement
proved too unreliable in the DSP test environment. Timestamps from the $(date)
bash variable were too inaccurate in that environment to be of any use in this
scenario.
Getting the CPU and throughput values for every connection amount was done man-
ually. CPU utilization info is queried from the BGW with control plane signalling
mechanism and the throughput is the network adapter transmit rate of the system
that is generating the traﬃc. It was noticed during testing that encrypted data
traﬃc was noticeably larger, due the overhead that TLS protocol adds. So all the
throughput values were collected from the trusted side that is sending non-encrypted
5. Testing methods and software 44
messages. 64 data points can be collected by hand, with hundreds of connections,
an automated script would have been needed, but for this amount it was simpler to
get the data by hand instead of making a script for it.
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6. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The results are presented in this chapter and their signiﬁcance is discussed. First
the outcome of security related testing is gone through and after that latency and
throughput benchmarks are discussed and compared between the platforms.
6.1 Security
Before the security related testing results are discussed, it is important to mention
that a certain level of abstraction is maintained here because of the nature of the
tested object. The Border Gateway is a commercial product that is responsible,
for its own part, for maintaining a secure network border, so going in to too much
detail on the found vulnerabilities is avoided. Security related testing was originally
planned to provide results and to be compared between the platforms to ﬁnd the
possible diﬀerences and challenges when transitioning to a cloud platform.
As reasoned in Section 5.1, only the DSP platform needed to be tested so this
became purely an exercise on ﬁnding vulnerabilities on the DSP platform. The
parts that was tested were IP, TCP and TLS protocol implementations of the DSP
platform. Before testing was started there was no notion of anything being wrong
with the tested software. There were no known problems or bugs with the protocol
implementations so the goal was basically to try and ﬁnd a way to get the DSP
platform to do something that was not designed by only having a direct network
access to it.
If it would be possible to aﬀect the correct operation of the system just by having
a network access to it, the system could not be considered very secure. Using
malformed IP packets to exploit vulnerabilities of a device that is behind a NAT
should not be possible because the NAT usually replaces most, if not all, the IP
header ﬁelds with new ones, but this is not the case for TCP. In theory, an attacker
could initiate a normal chat session with somebody and modify some of the outgoing
TCP packets carrying the MSRP data to have malformed ﬁelds in an attempt to
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exploit a vulnerability in the TCP/IP stack of the terminating endpoint, in this case
the BGW. As stated in Section 3.1, the attacker can be presumed to have unlimited
resources and time, so they will ﬁnd a way, if there is one to be found, theoretical
or not.
The Codenomicon testing software comprises of test suites for many diﬀerent pro-
tocols. There are many conﬁguration options that need to be correct so that the
tested platform can communicate with the test suite. Depending on the tested pro-
tocol, the complexity of the required conﬁgurations vary. Testing was started at
the bottom of the protocol stack to ensure that we have a complete picture of the
viability of the underlying protocol implementations once we start to test the upper
level protocols.
Testing any protocol requires that the tested system has a service that is willing to
communicate with the protocol in question. This is easy to achieve, at least for the
IP test suite. Any system that has an IP address also implements Internet Control
Message Protocol (ICMP) as it is one of the main protocols of the Internet Protocol
Suite. The ICMP echo request, also known as ping, must be answered with an ICMP
echo reply and this mechanism is what the Codenomicon IP suite was selected to
use to test the system's TCP/IP stack. Basically, the Codenomicon IP suite sent
malformed ICMP echo requests to test the IP stack of the tested system.
There were around 170 000 test cases that were performed by the software and 17
of them were found to get the IP stack of the DSP in such a state, that it became
unresponsive. These cases required that there were speciﬁc errors on two diﬀerent
ﬁelds of the IP header, but still all of the cases were exploiting the same ﬂaw in
the code. This type of vulnerability could be used against the system as a type of
denial-of-service (DoS) attack as all IP-based traﬃc would cease once the IP stack
stops to operate after it receives the correctly malformed IP packet.
A service that accepts incoming TCP packets and acts on them is also required for
the TCP test suite so there needs to be a port that is actively listened by a process
for incoming TCP connections. The DSP embedded platform could be accessed
through a Telnet interface and this meant that there is a process listening for a
speciﬁc port for Telnet connections. Performing a TCP handshake to this port is
possible even though we have no intention on using the Telnet service itself, which
makes it possible to test the TCP implementation of the DSP. The port and the
type of service we are supposedly using is conﬁgured to the Codenomicon TCP test
suite so that the suite can send a valid Telnet packet sequence as a valid test case
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to see if the DSP is still responding after a normal test case.
Around 340 000 test cases were ran and the failed ones could be divided to cases
that fail on their own and cases that require other cases to be sent prior to them
to get the system to become unresponsive and the tests to fail. The ﬁrst group of
cases were very similar to the ones found in IP testing as incorrect information on a
speciﬁc TCP header ﬁeld made the TCP/IP stack become unresponsive. Identifying
the problem is straightforward once a single test case is identiﬁed that fails every
time, but the situation is not so clear when test cases require other cases to be sent
before them to get a result. The decisive hint proved to be the fact that every case
that required prior tests required the same number prior tests. Certain cases made
the Telnet service to not free up the allocated memory for the connection in question
and eventually the memory ran out and undesirable things happened.
The goal was to test the TCP implementation through the Telnet service, not the
service itself. Getting failing protocol tests cases due to application bugs made
it harder to analyse the results and took extra time when answers were searched
in the wrong places. The Telnet service was used for its convenience as it was
the only readily available service listening for TCP connections in the embedded
platform. The positive outcome from this was that a system breaking bug was
found, even though the Telnet service is only used for debugging purposes and is
normally disabled.
The ﬁndings from the TCP/IP stack testing were reported to the developer and they
made the required corrections and supplied a new version. The original tests were
executed a second time to verify that system can handle all the thousands of vari-
ations of malformed protocol messages. After this the TCP/IP stack is considered
secure enough for our purposes.
The last protocol to be tested was TLS and the only service that had TLS capability
was the actual BGW application software. Every test case closes the connection at
the end, so between every case, a new connection request needs to be sent through
signalling messages so that the BGW actually accepts the connection made by Co-
denomicon test suite. This requirement made the test suite conﬁguration more
complex, but once everything was set up correctly, the tens of thousands of cases
would execute slowly but automatically.
The TLS implementation comes from OpenSSL version that was modiﬁed to be
used in the DSP embedded platform. Regardless of the modiﬁcations, the actual
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cryptographic functions were untouched and nothing was expected to be discovered
through Codenomicon fuzz testing. This assumption proved to be right, as only
minor error handling corrections were made to the application software based on
the TLS testing results. Not a single test case failed due to OpenSSL.
Codenomicon Defensics fuzz testing platform proved to be an invaluable tool for
testing protocol implementations, but the biggest limiting factor that hindered test-
ing was time. Depending on the tested protocol, a single test suite instance could
execute about one to two test cases per second. The full test proﬁles of the suites
can have millions of test cases and executing them all is not feasible. For example,
full test proﬁle of the IP test suite contains 3,2 million tests cases and it could take
weeks for all the tests to execute. This can be overcome by running multiple test in-
stances simultaneously, but a single instance required up to 1GB of system memory
so only a couple could be used at the same time as the system ran out of memory.
It was stated in Section 5.1 that every reasonable action should be taken to ensure
security and running week long test runs is bordering unreasonable. The default
test proﬁles provided a good coverage while being manageable as they needed to be
run multiple times during testing.
6.2 Latency
Latency measurements were only performed for the virtualized platform. One vir-
tual machine was running the application software and other separate instance was
sending and receiving the data, basically the same setup as in Figure 5.2. A baseline
measurement was done to measure the delay that is present in the cloud environ-
ment. The delay between the two instances and the probable inaccuracies that are
caused by the measurement method, added up to be 1 to 2 ms. So this amount
of delay will be present at minimum and anything above it will be induced by the
application.
First the 32 connection pairs were set up that only sent a short text message ran-
domly between 1 and 10 seconds, so system load was very low. These latency values
are plotted in Figure 6.1. No decimals were calculated which causes the visible
vertical lines in the distribution. With 5000 individual messages the latencies seem
to distribute very evenly. Roughly all the messages arrive after 2 to 12 ms. If we
subtract the known error of 2 ms, then the latency would be 0 to 10 ms. This
is a good result, as it is known that the software forwards the data every 10 ms.
So if a message arrives just before the 10 ms interval, then it is forwarded almost
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immediately and the latency is what is caused by other factors, in this case being
the 2 ms. And if it arrives just after the interval, then the packet waits for the full
10 ms before it is forwarded. This behaviour is clear in the graph.
Figure 6.1: Message latency measured with no additional system load.
The result we are after is what happens with the latencies when the system is
under heavy load. This is the same conﬁguration as previously with the diﬀerence
that there are additional 32 connection pairs sending data with no artiﬁcial limits.
System CPU load was around 70-80%, so close to the maximum utilization. The
result is in Figure 6.2 and it is quite surprising. The latencies actually drop under
heavy load. This is caused by the mechanism in the software that lowers the interval
from 10 ms to a minimum of 1ms, depending on the load level.
With couple of exceptions, all message latencies seem to distribute between 3 to 6
ms, so not even close to anything that would be visible to the users in chat sessions.
The behaviour we were after is not present so these latency measurements proved
to be just a veriﬁcation that every connection is treated equally. Another partial
failure was that the measurement technique didn't work in the environment used
in the DSP application testing, as baseline measurements showed that the results
were too unreliable. Because there is no hint of increased latencies, overhauling the
measurement technique just for the DSP environment would not be worth the eﬀort.
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Figure 6.2: Message latency measured with high system load.
6.3 Throughput
The performance characteristics of the platforms are important information regard-
ing the product's capabilities and how many users can be served per one computing
core, but regarding this thesis work, we are more interested on how they compare
and what causes the diﬀerences. To get comparable results from both platforms,
the measurement process must be as similar as possible. The used environments
are generally the same, meaning that the used tools and Linux distributions are the
same but most likely diﬀerent versions. Regardless of these diﬀerences, the results
should be accurate enough so that they can be compared.
After the connections are set up, all that the BGW is doing is basically just en-
crypting data with AES cipher with a key size of 128 bits, because that symmetric
algorithm was used by default. No decryption is performed because of the one way
traﬃc ﬂow of the test, but there should not be any noticeable diﬀerence if data is
decrypted or encrypted [41]. If the data is not encrypted, then all the computational
costs come from the cost of forwarding packets from one port to another. In such
a case, it would mean that both UEs are located on a trusted network and in such
a case, the traﬃc is just relayed over the BGW. Measuring performance without
encryption is not an actual use case regarding this work, but it gives additional data
about the cryptographic capabilities of the system.
Before going through the results, we know from Subsection 3.2.3, that the platforms
should be capable of processing, when converted to bits, about 4,5 Gbit/s in the
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cloud and 0,3 Gbit/s in the DSP platform. This is a synthetic benchmark and does
not have much signiﬁcance when measuring the real performance of the system, but
what we can deduct from this, is that at least for the modern x86 processor, the rates
are so high that many other factors will be limiting the performance long before the
theoretical encryption rate is achieved. Also, when fewer CPU cycles are consumed
by the encryption process, more cycles are available to be used somewhere else and
the performance scales with the traﬃc accordingly.
The measurements were done with and without encryption. In the latter case, the
only diﬀerence in Figure 5.2 is that both sides have a netcat instance as there is no
encrypted traﬃc. Every graph have three plots, CPU utilization, total throughput
and single connection throughput. Every plot consists of 64 data points that were
collected manually for every number of connections. CPU and throughput values
do not stay static so all the data points are an approximation of the current average
value collected by hand so there is naturally some inaccuracies involved, but with
multiple data points the overall trend should be accurate enough. The single con-
nection plot is derived from the total throughput graph by dividing the it with the
number of connections, but this is a valid result as additional testing was performed
to validate that every connection receives an equal share of the total throughput.
Figure 6.3: DSP system performance with no encryption.
DSP platform graph without encryption is in Figure 6.3, which is a logical place to
start inspecting the results. It becomes obvious that CPU and throughput plots are
nearly identical and any big diﬀerences most likely occur from the approximation
of the collected values. Some unknown and undeﬁned behaviour takes place at the
beginning of the graph. There is no obvious reason why the throughput should drop
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from 70 Mbit/s with 6 connections to 50 Mbit/s with 8. After 30 connections this
behaviour seem to disappear. One important thing to notice is that the maximum
rate for one connection is capped by the application at 12 Mbit/s so that is the
reason why one connection at the beginning doesn't get more than that.
Figure 6.4: DSP system performance with encryption.
More relevant data is in Figure 6.4 where encryption is enabled. Maximum total
rate without it seemed to be 75 Mbit/s and with encryption it is around 26 Mbit/s.
A three fold decrease in performance when data is encrypted brings the total rate
so low that only two connections can be served at their maximum rate. At 64
connections the throughput of one connection is 0,4 Mbit/s and as such is very
moderate. Every connection consists of two users who both can send ﬁles at the
same time and if this happens, then the rate of one user is 0,2 Mbit/s, for both
ingress and egress traﬃc. How often does a user send ﬁles instead of chat messages?
It completely depends on the users how this service is received and utilized. There
are 128 users for 64 connections and it only takes any two of them to send a ﬁle at
the same time and the utilization of the DSP core is near maximum.
Results without encryption for the virtualized platform are in Figure 6.5. Every-
thing is going as expected until around 40 connections are reached. The undeﬁned
behaviour we encountered earlier seem to be manifesting here also but on a larger
scale. It seems that once the maximum CPU utilization is achieved and new connec-
tions cannot be served any more with the rate of previous connections, all rates are
halved. Total throughput peaks at 410 Mbit/s with 37 connections so it is six times
more capable than the DSP platform. As the virtual platform is operating with a
core speed of 2400 MHz and the DSP with 625 MHz, there is a four fold diﬀerence in
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Figure 6.5: Virtualized system performance with no encryption.
MHz and therefore the performance diﬀerence doesn't correlate directly with MHz
because of the diﬀerences in CPU architectures and other system factors. This is a
good place to compare the eﬀects of MHz as no encryption is used and the AES-NI
instruction set does not create an advantage for the virtualized platform.
Figure 6.6: Virtualized system performance with encryption.
Final Figure 6.6 is the graph for virtualized platform with encryption. Throughput
peaks at around 240 Mbit/s with 21 connections and again with 45 connections at
250 Mbit/s. The next peak is about to happen as CPU utilization approaches its
limit, but the connection limit is achieved before it. In pure performance numbers,
the application runs ten times faster on virtualized platform than it does on the DSP
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platform. Even if raw throughput ability might not be the deciding factor regarding
the RCS use case, the virtualized platform can serve ten times more concurrent
users than the DSP. The AES instruction set in the x86 architecture is the main
reason why the performance diﬀerence grows when compared to the case without
encryption, from six to ten fold diﬀerence. Four times more MHz and an instruction
set that doubles the performance, so with crude arithmetic the result would be eight
times more performance, not quite the actual result but still relatively close.
The mentioned undeﬁned behaviour is tied to the moment when CPU utilization
cannot grow any more. This happens ten times faster on the DSP and hence the
plots diﬀer. If the test would have been performed on the virtualized platform
with 640 connections, then the graph trends would probably look alike. The testing
method would scale to any number of connections without extra eﬀort, but gathering
640 data points by hand would not be practical. This also works in the opposite
direction, if we compare the DSP performance with 6 connections to the virtualized
platform with 64, then the trend becomes visible. This graph is in Figure A.1 and
it is very similar with Figure 6.6, which veriﬁes that the both platforms perform
similarly when the performance diﬀerence is taken into account. This also applies
to the case without encryption when the original DSP graph is scaled down to one
sixth of the connections to 11 connection in Figure A.2, as it is very similar as
Figure 6.5.
Overall, the performance diﬀerences between the platforms proved to be quite broad.
Directly comparing the performance of a single computing core between the plat-
forms might not be quite fair, as they are very diﬀerent by nature. A single ATCA-
based BGW houses hundreds of DSP cores, and as a carrier grade hardware, costs
tens of thousands of euros. How much does the same amount of capacity cost when
it is taken from the pool of resources in the cloud? How much electricity both plat-
forms consume? These questions fall outside the scope of this thesis, but the results
should provide information when decisions are made regarding the viability of Telco
cloud and how capable the current generation of x86 hardware is for this type of
telecommunication applications.
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7. CONCLUSION
Using the diﬀerences in characteristics between the DSP's and virtualized platform's
ability to handle the encrypted non-real-time traﬃc proved to be a suitable case to
study the challenges of virtualization in telecommunication applications. The used
processors are made for diﬀerent purposes and the market forces behind the general
purpose x86 processors ensure that the technology is advancing more rapidly, which
means that the x86 processors are starting to handle the tasks that previously needed
a special purpose processor, like the DSP, to make operation feasible. Handling the
tight real-time constraints of telecommunication applications is one of the general
challenges when moving to the cloud. The virtual machines use the pool of resources
of the cloud and ensuring that the assigned resources are always ready to serve
without delay to ensure carrier grade service requirements is one of the features that
Telco cloud need to provide.
In this case the BGW application is performing the responsibilities of a Session
Border Controller, which is basically just a terminating endpoint for encrypted con-
nections and forwarding the packets to the non-encrypted side. These operations
don't utilize the inherent advantages of the DSP over the general purpose processor,
so they are almost equal MHz to MHz. The big diﬀerentiating factor is that the
modern x86 processors are operating in a much higher frequency. In this case the
processor in the virtualized platform had four times more MHz and also the AES-NI
instruction set that halves the time the processor needs for AES operations, meaning
that the symmetric encryption performance doubles. Overall, the application oper-
ating on a single CPU core was ten times more capable on the virtualized platform,
meaning it can possibly serve ten times more concurrent users.
We are moving away from the closed world of proprietary software and hardware
of the ATCA ecosystem to the cloud where most of the used software can be open
source and thus used by a much larger audience. This minimizes the extra security
eﬀorts that are required in the case of closed software. The TCP/IP protocol stack
is part of the operating system and in Linux it can be presumed to be robust. The
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stack is also part of the real-time operating system that the DSP platform is running
on and through protocol fuzz testing ﬂaws were unveiled that could have been used
for DoS attacks, for example. Regarding security, it makes sense to use software that
has been, and will be, the target of active attacks because if a ﬂaw is discovered
from them, the actual rewards for the attackers are high because the software is in
use in many diﬀerent systems, and therefore it must be securely implemented.
Testing was done with the latest x86 server processors which is possible because their
update cycle is fast compared to digital signal processors. The DSP used in this
thesis is just about to be replaced by a new generation, that has higher operating
frequency and cryptographic instruction sets. So comparing processors that have
many years between them might be unfair, but this is the nature of slow DSP update
cycles. Though, studying the capability of the new generation DSP is reserved for
possible future work.
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A. APPENDIX
Scaling the DSP encryption performance Figure 6.4 to one tenth of the connections
to reﬂect the same amount of relative load as the virtual platform is shown below
and it becomes clear that the application behaves very similarly on both platforms
when the performance diﬀerence is taken into account. The trend of the graph in
Figure A.1 is very similar as the virtual application performance graph in Figure 6.6.
Figure A.1: Same as DSP performance graph in Figure 6.4, but scaled to 6 connections.
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Scaling Figure 6.3 to one sixth of the connections to reﬂect the same relative load as
the virtual platform in the case without encryption reveals the similarities. Trends
in Figure A.2 and Figure 6.5 are very similar, as the application behaviour between
platforms is very comparable, when the performance diﬀerence is taken into account.
Figure A.2: Same as DSP performance graph without encryption in Figure 6.3, but scaled
to 11 connections.
